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Abstract
This paper presents an examination of how religio-ethnic identity, individual religiosity, and 
family members’ religiosity are related to preferred family size in Nepal. Analyses of survey data 
from the Chitwan Valley Family Study show that socioeconomic characteristics and individual 
experiences can suppress, as well as largely account for, religio-ethnic differences in fertility 
preferences. These religio-ethnic differentials are associated with variance in particularized 
religious theologies or general value orientations (like son preference) across groups. In addition, 
individual and family religiosity are both positively associated with preferred family size, 
seemingly because of their association with religious beliefs that are likely to shape fertility 
strategies. These findings suggest improvements in how we conceptualize and empirically 
measure supra-individual religious influence in a variety of settings and for a range of 
demographically interesting outcomes.
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Existing theory about fertility behavior emphasizes how structural or economic changes in 
society lead to changes in birthrates and highlights changes in family size preferences as a 
key mechanism in the process (Notestein 1945; Becker 1960; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). 
In settings with persistently high fertility, discussions of how to further limit birthrates often 
focus on how to meet unmet need and how to lower family size preferences. In this paper, 
we present an investigation of family size preferences in Nepal, a relatively high fertility 
setting, and a regularly hypothesized source of high family size ideals – religion.
Sociologists and demographers have documented numerous social contexts across time in 
which fertility behavior differs along religio-ethnic lines, including Western Europe 
(Derosas and van Poppel 2006), the United States (Freedman et al. 1959; Ryder and Westoff 
1971; Mosher et al. 1992), the Middle East (Chamie 1981), and South and Southeast Asia 
(Knodel et al. 1987; Johnson 1993; Morgan et al. 2002; Dharmalingam and Morgan 2004; 
Mishra 2004). However, we have little empirical evidence of why or how religion is related 
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to fertility preferences and behaviors (c.f., Derosas and van Poppel 2006; Hayford and 
Morgan 2008). Studies of religious differences often stop at the finding of statistically 
significant differences between religious groups, after controlling for socioeconomic 
confounding variables (Goldscheider 2006). This type of approach is limited, because 
residual statistically significant differences could also stem from unmeasured non-religious 
characteristics. This lack of empirical examination of proposed mechanisms for religion-
fertility links limits our understanding of why religious differences exist.
The three most frequent explanations for religious differences in fertility are that 
particularized theologies related to contraceptive use lead to higher fertility, that status 
differentials drive minority groups to delay or forgo births in an effort to be socially mobile, 
and/or that socioeconomic differences between groups explain the differences observed 
across religious groups (Goldscheider 1971). In addition, to more fully understand religion's 
impact on fertility, we should consider both specific and general components of religious 
ideologies that might influence fertility, as well as the extent to which these ideologies are 
actively engaged, reinforced, and referenced in individuals’ lives through religious practice 
and interaction with others who are religious (McQuillan 1999, 2004; Goldscheider 2006).
This paper presents a theoretical framework expanding current theories of religion's 
relationship to fertility by specifying multiple dimensions of religion and conceptualizing 
the influence of religious others. From the framework, we specify setting-specific 
hypotheses about the relationship between religion and the family size preferences of young 
adults (ages 15-24) living in the Chitwan Valley of south-central Nepal. We then present 
results from tests of these hypotheses using data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study 
(CVFS).
Connections between Religion and Fertility
The role of religion and cultural factors is apparent across many theories of fertility. For 
example, Notestein (1945) discusses how religious doctrine encourages high fertility and 
writes that the power of values and customs could limit the influence of economic 
development on fertility. Elaborating classic transition theory, Lesthaeghe and others 
(Lesthaeghe 1983; Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988) argue that 
the loss of religious authority over realms of life such as family, along with increasing 
individualism, were key factors in European fertility transitions. Also, Thornton (2005) 
contends that “developmental idealism,” a package of ideas promoting small families and 
affecting family change, has at times been both encouraged and hindered by religion.
Many empirical studies of religion and fertility focus on the influence of membership in a 
particular religious group on fertility behavior. Three alternative, but not mutually exclusive, 
hypotheses have been offered for the differences found. First, Goldscheider (1971) argues 
that particularized theologies, or explicit theological canon about family size and 
contraception, and more general value orientations and worldviews may influence 
demographic behavior. For example, religions that encourage early marriage, universal 
childbearing, a patriarchal home environment in which women have little say in 
reproductive decisions, son preference, or an overall fatalistic outlook in life, also indirectly 
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promote higher fertility (McQuillan 2004; Hayford and Morgan 2008). In general, those 
who belong to a religio-ethnic group in which particularized theologies or general value 
orientations encourage larger families, will desire more children than those affiliated with 
religio-ethnic groups whose ideologies are less pronatalist. Following from this, the more 
committed one is to a pronatalist religion, the more pronatalist that individual should be 
(Hayford and Morgan 2008).
A second explanation for religio-ethnic fertility differentials is the characteristics 
proposition. Social, demographic, and economic attributes of various religio-ethnic groups 
often partly explain how a group's reproductive behavior differs from others (e.g. access to 
educational and economic opportunities; Goldscheider 1971; Jeffery and Jeffery 1997). The 
typical way in which these ideas are tested is to ascertain respondents’ religious affiliations 
or identifications and assign dummy variables delineating the major religious groups to be 
compared. Baseline models include dummy variables and standard demographic controls. 
Subsequent models include socioeconomic variables, such as education or income to see if 
the effects of religious affiliation are minimized or disappear. If statistically significant 
differences between religio-ethnic groups remain, there is said to be evidence for a 
particularized theologies effect. We extend this approach by empirically exploring how 
identification with a certain religion relates to family size preferences through specific 
values and ideologies.
A third potential explanation of religious group differentials in fertility is the minority group 
status hypothesis. This is the idea that to achieve upward social mobility, minority religious 
groups will delay or avoid births (Goldscheider and Uhlenberg 1969). Of course, minority 
religious groups sometimes prefer separation from larger society, thus viewing high fertility 
as a way to increase their power. Either way, group status or power dynamics can impact 
fertility (McQuillan 2004). In Nepal, our research setting, we found little evidence of 
minority group dynamics in family size preferences, so we focus on the first two 
explanations— particularized theologies and characteristics—in addition to other extensions 
of a framework for understanding religious differentials.
One key expansion of the framework for understanding religion's influence on fertility we 
apply is relating the degree to which religious ideologies are practiced and valued to fertility 
preferences and behavior. Studies of religious influence suggest there are multiple 
dimensions of religion to consider (Cornwall et al. 1986; Hayford and Morgan 2008). As 
discussed earlier, membership in a particular religio-ethnic group represents an exposure to 
certain ideologies (specific and general) on a continuum of pronatalism. However, it is the 
extent to which religious practices and beliefs are a part of a person's life that influence 
whether a person is more likely to use religious ideologies to frame acceptable strategies of 
life, including preferences for family size (Wimberley 1989; McQuillan 2004).
The framework for understanding religion's connection to fertility preferences is also 
broadened by expanding from an individual-level perspective to an explicitly social 
perspective. A common approach is to consider the role of one's religious institution, its 
leaders, and one's fellow congregants (Trinitapoli and Weinreb 2012). Increasingly, research 
suggests that the religious characteristics of influential others such as spouses, parents, and 
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friends are related to the attitudes and behaviors of individuals (Stark et al. 1982; Stark 
1996; Ellison et al. 1999; Pearce 2002a, 2002b; Pearce and Haynie 2004). Therefore, the 
more religious and pronatalist an individual's social networks are, the higher their family 
size preferences might be.
Finally, the framework for studying religion and fertility will benefit from testing its 
hypotheses outside Western, predominately Judeo-Christian regions. Further study of the 
multidimensional influence of religion on fertility preferences and behavior in new regions 
with different religions will help refine present theories and models. This study presented 
here extends our knowledge of how religion and fertility are connected, by examining their 
relationship in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal. Below, we describe the setting for this study 
and present setting-specific hypotheses for links between religion and family size 
preferences.
Setting
Studying the relationship between religion and family size preferences is most ideal in an 
area with variation in religio-ethnic groups, in religiosity, and in family size preferences, but 
little variation in other characteristics. In the study presented here, the focus is on the 
Chitwan Valley of Nepal, where a variety of ethnic and religious groups coexist, and all 
residents of the area have been exposed to similar socioeconomic circumstances for decades. 
The Chitwan Valley lies tucked into the base of the Himalayan foothills in south central 
Nepal just across the border from the Indian State of Bihar. Aside from a small urban area in 
the northernmost corner of the valley, the area is primarily rural with most families engaging 
in agriculture.
Rates of family-related behaviors such as fertility and contraceptive use have been changing 
in Chitwan, as they have throughout Nepal, over the past 60 years. Nepalese women went 
from having over six children on average in the 1960s to approximately five in the 
mid-1990s (Tuladhar 1989; Suwal 2001). An increase in contraceptive use has also been 
occurring, with fewer than three per cent of married women aged 15-49 using a modern 
method of contraception before the 1980s and 26 per cent by the mid-1990s (UN 2011). 
These behavioral changes are in part due to social changes including the increased 
accessibility of contraception and the spread of media messages encouraging small families 
(Axinn and Barber 2001; Axinn and Yabiku 2001). Importantly for the study presented here, 
while fertility has decreased in Chitwan and throughout Nepal it has not done so equally 
across social groups (Retherford and Thapa 2004). Religion may be a factor in those varying 
rates of change.
As throughout Nepal, religion, or dharma, is a key component of identity and everyday life 
in the Chitwan Valley. According to the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) survey data 
from 1996, the residents of the valley are 76 per cent Hindu and 15 per cent Buddhist, with a 
small Muslim population (.74 per cent), and an even smaller Christian population (.51 per 
cent). Only 4.5 per cent of respondents report no religious affiliation. Because the main 
religions in Nepal are not exclusionary, individuals incorporate a variety of religions in their 
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system of beliefs and practices. It is therefore important to understand the religious systems 
common to each religio-ethnic group.
The caste system in Nepal has four general levels, but only three are well-represented in the 
Chitwan Valley. High Caste Hindus are at the top of the caste system, Lower Caste Hindus 
are at the bottom, and Non-Hindu Nepalese ethnic groups fall in between. The fourth group 
which falls just above Lower Caste Hindus but is represented by less than one per cent of 
Chitwan Valley residents are non-Hindu foreigners (e.g., Muslims who have migrated from 
India).
According to the CVFS, 94 and 79 per cent of all High and Low Caste Hindus identify as 
Hindu, respectively. Those who do not identify as primarily Hindu split almost evenly into 
the categories of Buddhist or no religious affiliation, with a small number saying some other 
religion. High Caste Hindus generally follow religious mores about bathing, dressing, 
worshiping, eating, and interacting with others more closely than Low Caste Hindus. They 
also generally participate in religious ceremonies and rituals more often.
Among CVFS respondents, 81 per cent of all Gurungs, Lamas, and Tamangs identify 
themselves as Buddhists. They are of Tibeto-Burmese descent and migrated to Chitwan 
from the hill districts of Nepal. Because government control in Nepal largely belongs to 
High Caste Hindus, and Nepali is the national language, Hindu rituals and festivals are 
heavily promoted and encouraged. Although, Hinduism and Buddhism are syncretic 
religions, with Buddha believed to have been born in Nepal as a reincarnation of a Hindu 
god (Dastider 1995). Not surprisingly, 10 per cent of Gurungs, Lamas, and Tamangs identify 
as Hindu. Four and six per cent identify with another or no religion respectively. In general, 
however, Gurungs, Lamas, and Tamangs are far less likely than Hindu castes to regularly 
practice Hindu rituals or worship.
The other ethnic group we examined in the study presented here is the Tharu who are a 
group indigenous to the Chitwan Valley. The Tharu belief system and rituals have become 
more Hindu-like over the years (Gurung 1992; Guneratne 1994). Of the Tharus living in the 
Chitwan Valley, 81 per cent identify themselves as followers of Hinduism and the rest 
divide relatively evenly into the categories Buddhist or no religious affiliation and a smaller 
percentage of other religion.
Setting-Specific Hypotheses
Religious Ideology and Family Size Preferences
The theoretical framework outlined above hypothesizes that particularized theologies and 
general value orientations will explain religio-ethnic group differentials in family size. Here, 
we describe specifically how features of Hindu and Buddhist ideologies may influence 
fertility preferences.
Most religions are pronatalist, but within Hinduism pronatalism finds a rather strong voice. 
There are two paths to Hindu enlightenment. The rarer option is the path of asceticism 
where all worldly goods and attachments (including family) are denied. The more common 
path is called the “householder's path” (Bennett 1983) which encourages the building of 
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merit and the partial fulfillment of religious duty through good deeds such as childbearing. 
According to Hindu teaching, not only is it a woman's religious duty to have children, but 
vasectomized men are considered impure and cannot participate in religious ceremonies 
(Gray 1995). In general, Hinduism gives childbearing a powerful meaning and portrays it as 
necessary to complete life.
The Mahayana Buddhism practiced in Nepal is much less explicitly pronatalist than 
Hinduism is. Thus, for members of the more Buddhist religio-ethnic groups, childbearing is 
less essential in religious terms. We are not suggesting that Buddhism is anti-natalist, rather 
that there are fewer Buddhist theologies directly encouraging the value of larger families.
When it comes to general value orientations, one feature of Hinduism distinguishing it from 
Buddhism is its emphasis on fatalism (Bista 1991). When family size is considered to be out 
of one's control, preferred family size and achieved fertility are high. During semi-structured 
interviews with Hindus about their family size preferences, “preferred family size” is often 
described as “what Bhagwan (God) gives” or “according to Bhagwan.” Those from more 
Buddhist religio-ethnic groups do not reference God's will as often.
Hinduism also differs from Buddhism in that it contains a strong and explicit patriarchal 
component. Family organization is patrilineal, and men generally hold greater power than 
women in household decision-making. Hindus believe fathers are reborn in their sons and 
that sons are necessary for performing death rituals (Bennett 1983). On the other hand, in 
Buddhist homes, women face less discrimination, and death ceremonies do not require the 
presence of sons (Watkins 1996). Mahayana Buddhism is largely egalitarian including 
enlightenment being gender-neutral (Watkins 1996).
Due to both specific religious ideology and general values contained in certain religions’ 
worldviews, identifying with different religions gives individuals different schema for 
viewing the importance of having children and ideas for appropriate family size. In this 
context, we expect that members of the more Hindu religio-ethnic groups (High Caste 
Hindus, Low Caste Hindus, and Tharu) will have higher family size preferences than those 
of the more Buddhist religio-ethnic groups (Gurung, Lama, and Tamang). However, these 
differences will probably not be observable unless socioeconomic status is controlled.
In Nepal, the majority religio-ethnic group with historic power and prestige are the High 
Caste Hindus. They have had relatively unfettered access to schools and well-paying jobs, 
affording them more leisure time and resources to consume media such as television and 
movies that glamorize small families. Because these advantages are also associated with 
lower family size preferences, analyses to measure associations between religio-ethnic group 
and family size preferences must control for factors such as education and media exposure 
to observe the positive association between Hindu affiliation and family size preferences. 
Note that the relationship between religio-ethnic identity and fertility or family size 
preferences is not necessarily only a spurious relationship driven by education, or other 
socioeconomic characteristics, but in some situations, religious groups purposefully either 
encourage or discourage educational attainment (Sherkat and Darnell 1999; Glanville et al 
2008). In that case, religio-ethnic differences are working through educational attainment. 
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Our experience in this setting suggests Hindu and Buddhist principles rarely operate to 
encourage or discourage education, so we theorize education as a correlate of both religio-
ethnic identification and family size preferences, not a mechanism for the relationship 
between them.
Another characteristic of young adults that is likely associated with family size preferences 
is marital status. Those who are married at the time of the survey have tended to marry 
earlier than their peers, leading to larger family sizes in the end (Morgan and Taylor 2006). 
Further, we expect that religio-ethnic identification is related to marriage timing (Yabiku 
2006), so it is important to control for marital status when examining whether religious 
identification is related to family size preferences at a given point in time.
Religious Practice and Family Size Preferences
If, in a setting like this, all religions support having children to some degree, any type of 
religious involvement signals exposure and commitment to ideas that encourage larger 
families (Berghammer 2012). Also, the more individuals value larger families, the more they 
may participate in religion, knowing it is a social institution that justifies having many 
children. Thus, religious practice should be positively associated with preferred family sizes.
Even though religion's influence is often conceptualized at the individual level, we expect 
the religious characteristics of one's social networks will also shape his/her family size 
preference. In a previous study in this setting involving interviews with 17 young adults, the 
most influential socioreligious context in their lives was the family context (Pearce 2002b). 
Young adults were unable to articulate their own religious beliefs or practices but could 
easily describe those of their parents or grandparents. Therefore, the more religious a young 
adult's household is, the more likely his/her family members hold and encourage high family 
size preferences.
Data and Methods
To test our hypotheses, we used survey data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS). 
The CVFS is based on a sample of 171 neighborhoods systematically selected from the 
Chitwan Valley in south central Nepal (Barber et al. 1997). Within the CVFS 
neighborhoods, all 15-59 year-old residents, and their spouses (who may reside outside the 
selected neighborhoods), were interviewed privately in person between August 1996 and 
February 1997. Interviews were obtained from 97 per cent of the selected respondents, 
resulting in 5,272 total respondents. These data include measures of multiple dimensions of 
religiosity, a variety of beliefs and attitudes, parental characteristics, and complete life 
histories with regard to school, family, and other life experiences. Although these data are 
now almost 20 years old, they are important because they allow us the unique opportunity to 
explore these relationships in a setting where there is still substantial variation in religiosity 
and family formation preferences and behaviors.
For the analyses presented in this paper, we used a subsample of CVFS respondents. To 
examine childbearing preferences among young adults in the early years of family 
formation, we restricted the cases to those who are ages 15-24. We deleted members of 
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religio-ethnic groups which were too small in total size to provide reliable group 
comparisons. We also removed 14 people who were living alone at the time of the interview, 
because we cannot calculate household level-religiosity measures for this very small and 
unusual group. After these restrictions, the final sample size was 1,518 individuals. 
Descriptive statistics for this subsample of respondents are available in Table 1.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable was a scale created from a set of questions designed by Lolagene 
Coombs (1974) to ascertain underlying family size preference. The first item in the Coombs 
Scale measure was: “People often do not have exactly the same number of children they 
want to have. If you could have exactly the number of children you want, how many 
children would you want to have?” Using this preferred number as a basis, the second item 
was: “If you could not have exactly [the number the respondent gave] children, would you 
want to have [one number lower] or [one number higher]?” Then for the third question: “If 
you could not have [the second choice number] of children, would you want to have [one 
number lower] or [one number higher]?” Figure 1 displays the options a respondent has 
when answering the Coombs Scale questions. Depending on the path a respondent followed 
in answering these questions, s/he was coded as somewhere between 1 and 25. The median 
score for our sample was 5, corresponding with a first preference for two children, then one 
child (as opposed to three), and then three children (as opposed to none). Half of 
respondents had a score of 5 or 6 and almost 90 per cent had a score between 4 and 7, 
revealing a general preference for 2 or 3 children.
This family size preference may seem low since the TFR was around 4 in the mid-1990s. 
However, this is a young cohort and their childbearing unfolded over the following years. 
By 2006, when the youngest in our sample was 25, the TFR was just over 3, implying that 
the behavior of this cohort was ultimately not far off from their stated preferences (Ministry 
of Health and Population, et al. 2012).
The Coombs Scale's multiple question strategy has been used successfully in a number of 
studies around the world including the U.S., Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hungary, the 
Philippines, and Bogota (Coombs 1977, 1979; Coombs and Sun 1978). Individuals typically 
have a range of acceptable numbers of children, something that is masked by asking for one 
preferred number, and this scale reveals an individual's “potential or bias toward a larger or 
smaller family size” (Coombs 1979, pg. 26). We treated the Coombs Scale as an interval 
level measure.
Independent Variables
Religio-ethnic identity—During the CVFS individual-level interview, respondents were 
asked, “What is your father's caste/ethnicity?” For the analyses, we chose to focus on the 
four largest combinations of religio-ethnic groups found in this region: High Caste Hindus, 
Low Caste Hindus, Hill Tibeto-Burmese groups (Gurung, Lama, and Tamang), and Tharu. 
For each of these four groups there was a dummy variable coded 1 if a respondent belonged 
to that religio-ethnic group, otherwise coded 0. In all analyses presented here High Caste 
Hindus was the comparison category.
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Religiosity: religious practice—All respondents were asked about their own religious 
practice outside of the home: “How often do you do puja (worship) at a temple? More than 
once a month (coded 2), once a month or less (coded 1), or never (coded 0)?” Earlier 
versions of our analyses included religious practice in the home as an independent variable. 
However, there were no statistically significant relationships with in-home religious 
practice, so we focused solely on temple worship. To create a household-level average of 
religious practice, responses to this question were summed and averaged across all 
household members other than the focal respondent. For 66 per cent of respondents this 
household measure included their parents. Of the remaining respondents, 88 per cent 
(N=513) are married, implying that they are likely living with their spouse's parents. 
Together, this means that the household measures generally refer to natal homes for the 
unmarried and marital homes including parental in-laws for the married respondents. Both 
the individual and household averages range from 0 to 2 with a mean slightly more than 1, 
corresponding with praying at a temple once a month or less.
Particularized Theologies
Religious theologies: To assess the role of particularized religious theologies in these 
models, two measures of religious beliefs were used. First, respondents were asked about the 
belief that “Men who do not have children cannot go to swarga (heaven).” Response options 
were “strongly agree” (coded 4), “agree” (coded 3), “disagree” (coded 2), and “strongly 
disagree” (coded 1). The second measure was about the importance of performing religious 
funeral rituals when someone dies. Respondents were asked, “How important is it to you to 
perform shradha/arghau/tarpan (a religious ceremony pertaining to their particular religio-
ethnic group) for dead ancestors?” Response options were “very important” (coded 1), and 
“somewhat important” or “not important at all” (both coded 0 because only .05 per cent 
responded “not important at all”).
General value orientations: To capture the role of general value orientations in the 
connection of religion with family size preference, measures representing patriarchy, son 
preference, and the importance of childbearing were used. The measure of patriarchy was 
based on the statement, “Men should make all the decisions in a household.” Response 
options were “strongly agree” (coded 4), “agree” (coded 3), “disagree” (coded 2), and 
“strongly disagree” (coded 1).
A measure of son preference was created from a set of questions designed by Lolagene 
Coombs (Coombs 1977). Each respondent was first asked, “Let's forget the children that you 
have now for a while. If you had only three children would you want to have three daughters 
only, one son and two daughters, two sons and one daughter, or three sons only?” If a 
respondent answered “three daughters” his/her answer was coded as a “1” indicating strong 
daughter preference. Conversely, if a respondent answered “three sons,” his/her answer was 
coded as an “8” indicating strong son preference. If a respondent answered with a mixed 
gender preference, they were then asked up to three questions forcing them to choose and 
identify their preferred gender composition. The more positive their gender composition 
score, the more they preferred sons over daughters. (See Figure 2 for coding.) This multi-
question measure, patterned similarly to the dependent variable of interest in this paper, 
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provided an intricate measure of individuals’ views on preferable family gender 
composition.
The measure regarding childbearing was based on the following item: “It is okay for a 
person to decide not to have children.” Response options were “strongly agree” (coded 4), 
“agree” (coded 3), “disagree” (coded 2), and “strongly disagree” (coded 1).
Characteristics: The next set of variables was comprised of those that are considered to be 
socioeconomic characteristics that may account for religio-ethnic differences in family size 
preferences. We included two measures of parental characteristics. First, respondents were 
asked regarding both parents, “Did your father/mother ever attend school?” This variable 
was coded 2 if both parents attended school, 1 if one parent attended school, and 0 if neither 
parent attended school. We also included a continuous measure of the total number of 
children to whom the individual's mother gave birth.
The other measures we included to test the “characteristics hypothesis” were individual 
characteristics and experiences. First, we included a measure of the respondent's own 
education. This was a measure of the highest grade in school a respondent reported 
completing at the time of the survey (Freedman 1979; Caldwell 1982; Kasarda et al. 1986; 
Axinn 1993). Second, we controlled for the respondent's own media consumption (Caldwell 
1982; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Thornton 2005). Respondents were asked about reading 
the newspaper, listening to the radio, and watching television in the last year. Each question 
had four response categories ranging from 0 to 3. We created a scale of media exposure, by 
averaging the scores, to represent the average level of media exposure in the previous year 
for each respondent. Finally, we included a measure for whether a respondent is married or 
not (coded 0=no, 1=yes).
Control Variables
In the analyses, we controlled for two individual-level characteristics related to family size 
preferences that are exogenous to all the religion measures: age and gender. To measure age, 
we included the respondent's age at the time of the survey, and to assess the influence of 
gender we included a dummy variable coded 0 if the respondent is male and 1 if the 
respondent is female.
Analytic Strategy
Because the dependent variable was an interval level measure very closely approximating a 
continuous variable, we used ordinary least squares regression to estimate our models. The 
survey sample was clustered in selected neighborhoods, so to control for the tendency for 
neighbors to be more like each other than non-neighbors, we employed multilevel models 
that corrected for over-correlated errors.
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Overall Relationship of Religion to Family Size Preference
Model 1 in Table 2 presents estimates of the total relationship between religio-ethnic 
identity and family size preference, controlling for age and gender. Here we see that, Low 
Caste Hindu and Tharu respondents report larger family size preferences, on average, than 
High Caste Hindus. Gurungs, Lamas, and Tamangs do not differ significantly from High 
Caste Hindus, and in analyses not presented here, there is evidence that they have lower 
family size preferences than Low Caste Hindus and Tharus. In fact, Tharu's have statistically 
significantly higher family size preferences than all the other religio-ethnic groups.
The Coombs Scale does not reveal one number for desired family size; this is partly what 
makes it a better measure of fertility preferences but it makes interpreting the coefficients 
more difficult. Interpreting these religio-ethnic differences in terms of actual desired number 
of children requires looking at Figure 1. For example, a 19-year-old high caste Hindu 
woman would have a predicted value for the Coombs Scale of 5. Looking at Figure 1 we see 
that this corresponds with a fertility preference of first 2, then 1, then 3 children. On the 
other hand, a 19-year-old Tharu woman would have a predicted value of 7, corresponding 
more with a pattern of fertility preference of 2 children, then 3, then 4. (A value of 7 could 
also correspond with a pattern of 3, 2, 1, but few respondents selected that option.) The most 
appropriate interpretation of the estimated coefficients then is to think of higher or lower 
preferences more broadly and not in terms of specific numbers (Coombs 1979).
Role of Socioeconomic Characteristics
In model 2, parental education and own education have the expected negative and 
statistically significant relationship with family size preference. Also, those who are married 
have statistically significantly higher family size preferences. Even more interesting is what 
happens to the coefficients for the religion measures in the presence of these control 
variables. There is now a statistically significant difference between the more Buddhist 
Gurung, Lama, Tamang groups and the other more Hindu religio-ethnic groups. After 
controlling for educational attainment, media exposure, and marital status, the more 
Buddhist religio-ethnic groups score about .35 lower on the Coombs Scale than High Caste 
Hindus. Also, the difference in family size preferences between Low and High Caste Hindus 
goes away in the presence of these controls. We estimated adjusted Wald tests and found 
that these estimated coefficients are also statistically different from one another (this is true 
for all cross-model comparisons made below).
Analyses not presented here show that the appearance of a difference between High Caste 
Hindus and Gurungs, Lamas, and Tamangs and the disappearance of a difference between 
High Caste and Low Caste Hindus are primarily due to the relationship between education 
and family size preferences. High Caste Hindus typically have higher educational attainment 
than Low Caste Hindus, so controlling for education, High Caste Hindus’ family size 
preferences are more similar to those of Low Caste Hindus. Also, when controlling for 
education, we see more of a difference between the family size preferences of High Caste 
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Hindus versus the Gurung, Lama, Tamang groups. This could potentially stem from the two 
groups having differing ideologies regarding fertility and family size which we explore next.
Role of Religiosity
An important contribution of the study reported on here is the inclusion of measures of 
religiosity or religious practice in a non-Western setting and from both the individual- and 
household-level, as shown in Model 3. Both coefficients of individual and household 
religious practice are positive and statistically significant—the more a young adult or his/her 
family members perform worship in a temple, the more children that individual desires. 
Additionally, the magnitude of the relationship between household average religiosity and 
family size preference is larger than that between the individual's own religious practice and 
family size preference providing evidence that one's family members’ religiosity may be 
more related to family ideals than one's own religiosity. A young adult who goes to a temple 
more than once a month scores about a third of a point higher on the Coombs Scale than one 
who never goes to a temple. A young adult whose family members all visit temples more 
than once a month will score almost half a point higher on the Coombs Scale, compared to 
one whose family members are not religious at all.
Notice that there are small, but statistically significant, changes in relationships between 
religio-ethnic identity and family size preference when they are in the same model as 
measures of religious practice. This suggests that the association between religio-ethnic 
identity and family size preference is partly accounted for by differences between religio-
ethnic groups in religious practice. The coefficient for being a Gurung, Lama, or Tamang 
becomes less negative, so the lower frequency of attending religious temples for members of 
this group partly explains why they have lower family size preferences than High Caste 
Hindus. And for Tharus, when religious practice is controlled, they have even higher family 
size preferences than High Caste Hindus. Given the possibility that religious practice might 
be more strongly related to family size preferences for some religio-ethnic groups than 
others, we estimated interaction effects to test this and found no statistically significant 
results.
Role of Particularized Theologies
The results from Model 4 address whether or not two particular religious theologies can 
statistically account for some of the religio-ethnic differences or the influence of religiosity. 
Both the strength of belief in the Hindu idea that men must have children to achieve ultimate 
enlightenment and the value that an individual places on his/her religio-ethnic group's 
religious death rites are positively associated with family size preference. Interestingly, these 
theologies do not account for any of the relationship between religio-ethnic identity or 
household religiosity and family size preference, but they do for some of the relationship 
between individual religiosity and family size preference (the effect of individual religiosity 
becomes statistically insignificant and the effect estimate decreases when these beliefs are 
controlled for). In other words, one's own level of religious practice is positively associated 
with family size preference partly because being more religiously active is associated with 
believing more strongly that children are essential to men's status in the afterlife and that 
religious death rituals are essential.
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Role of General Value Orientations
Next, we examined the role of more general value orientations tied to religion. Model 5 of 
Table 2 presents the relationships between three general value orientations (believing that 
men should make all household decisions, son preference, and the importance of 
childbearing) and family size preference. The coefficient for the attitude about men's role in 
household decision making is not statistically significant, but the other two coefficients for 
general values are. The more a person prefers having sons over having daughters, the more 
children s/he desires to have. When we include this measure of son preference the 
coefficient for Gurung, Lama, and Tamang identification becomes insignificant. In other 
words, the lower family size preferences among the more Buddhist religio-ethnic groups 
(found after controlling for education, media exposure, and marital status) seem to be partly 
related to the lesser degree of son preference associated with being a member of these 
groups. If the more Buddhist groups and the High and Low Caste Hindu groups viewed the 
importance of sons versus daughters more similarly, their family sizes would be more 
similar. Son preference also at least partly accounts for the relationship between household 
religious practice and family size preference—individuals in more religious households have 
higher family size preferences partly because they also have stronger preferences for sons. It 
is likely that the more religious family members are, the more they may communicate to 
each other the importance of having (multiple) sons, thereby cultivating a desire for a larger 
family.
Also, in analyses not shown here, we found that it is primarily the inclusion of the idea that 
it is okay not to have children which makes the coefficient for the importance of death 
rituals statistically insignificant. This is perhaps not surprising given that although the death 
rituals do not all require the presence of sons, they do require the presence of children, so 
someone who values death rituals is also likely to believe it is crucial to have children.
In this final and full model (Model 5), several findings stand out. First, there remain 
differences in family size preferences by religio-ethnic group. The High Caste Hindus have 
lower family size preferences than the Tharus. Second, the relationships between individual 
and household-level religious practice and family size preference are not statistically 
significant, so particularized theologies and general value orientations seem to statistically 
account for the observed relationship between religious practice and family size preference. 
Finally, the attitudes about men needing a child to have a better afterlife, son preference, and 
childlessness all remain statistically significant independent of one another. This suggests 
there are unique attributes of each attitude that contribute to individuals’ thinking about 
family size. Across our models the decreases in effect sizes are small, but they are 
statistically significant and support our interpretations.
Conclusions
The evidence presented here highlights how multiple dimensions of religion at the 
individual and household level are correlated to family size preferences. Findings show that 
while High Caste Hindus appear to have the lowest family size preferences among religio-
ethnic groups in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal, being a member of a more Buddhist ethnic 
group, like Gurungs, Lamas, or Tamangs, is associated with having even lower family size 
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preferences than Hindus once education, media exposure, and marital status are controlled. 
This finding is unique, because there were no initially observed differences between these 
groups, but upon controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, differences were revealed. 
Thus, although socioeconomic characteristics explain fertility differentials in some cases, 
they can suppress them in others. In Nepal, and possibly other relatively high fertility 
contexts, education remains a powerful force in lowering family size preferences; however, 
education and other related socioeconomic factors do not completely neutralize the influence 
of competing schema, or models for what actions are possible and preferable, such as 
pronatalist ideas promulgated by religions.
As Johnson-Hanks et al. (2011) describe through the theory of conjunctural action, humans 
have access to multiple, sometimes competing, schema for informing the number of children 
it would be good to have. For example, in Nepal as in other places undergoing fertility 
transitions, the increasing value of education and push to invest in the quality instead of the 
quantity of one's children are part of an education-based schema that encourages fewer 
births. On the other hand, certain Hindu schema about rewards in this life and the after-life 
encourage having more children. Both schemas are accessible and appealing in some regard 
to individuals, especially Hindus, in Nepal, so while one schema may limit the number of 
children seen as preferable the other may counteract that influence so that religious identity 
and practice is associated to some degree with one's view of the preferred family size. The 
extent to which religious schema are reinforced through practices or discussions with family 
members or more heavily rivaled by schema such as those promoting the economic benefits 
of smaller families will vary across people and settings, but it does not diminish the fact that 
these religiously informed schema exist and hold the potential to motivate behavior 
(Thornton 2005).
Another question raised in considering religion's influence is the extent to which we can 
assess religion's impact isolated from ethnicity or caste in in settings where religious identity 
is often ascribed at birth. In fact, rather than use the term, “religious affiliation,” we rely on 
“religio-ethnic identification,” to recognize the impossibility of cleanly separating their 
“effects.” Caste introduces even more of a power hierarchy that underlies access to 
resources relevant to family decision-making. Religion is often part of ethnicity, but two 
members of the same ethnic group may practice religion differently, and two members of the 
same religion may belong to different ethnic or caste groups. Religion, ethnicity, and caste 
are three aspects of identity which are heavily intertwined in ways that cannot be theorized, 
conceptualized, or measured separately. Rather, we argue for an approach which describes 
and theorizes the influence of these intersections within religio-ethnic groups, and suggest 
this be supplemented with further examination of how specific ideologies serve as 
mechanisms for the relationship between religio-ethnic identity and fertility preferences.
In addition to detailing religio-ethnic differences in family size preference, the analyses 
presented in this paper demonstrate an association between household religiosity and family 
size preferences. The more often household members worship at a temple, the more children 
a young adult desires. This suggests that household religiosity exposes youth to values that 
promote larger families. Whether this relationship between family religiosity and family size 
preferences holds up in other settings has yet to be explored, along with relationships 
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between the religious nature of other social contexts such as peer groups, schools, and work 
environments, and in relation to other outcomes.
We also present evidence of a tight connection between religious practice and ideology. The 
relationships that both an individual's own religious practice and the household's level of 
religious practice have with family size preference are largely due to associations between 
religious practice and particularized theologies and general value orientations. This offers 
support for the particularized theologies hypothesis (Goldscheider 1971). However, the 
specific ideological measures investigated here do not fully explain the relationship between 
religio-ethnic identity and family size preference. It may be that other theologies or general 
value orientations are at work (although we explored other measures regarding marriage and 
the family and did not find any significant effects). It may also be that the remaining 
association is a result of unmeasured socioeconomic differences between religio-ethnic 
groups. Given the legacy of Nepal's caste system, religio-ethnic identity and economic 
opportunity and achievement are highly intertwined. Better measuring these socioeconomic 
differences could improve our estimates of the relationship between features of religiosity 
and family size preferences.
Most of the respondents in our analysis were not married at the time of the interview (62 per 
cent), so the measure of family religiosity refers to members of their natal home, not their 
marital home. Of those who are married, some had moved to live with in-laws, so the 
measure of family religiosity represents their marital family with whom they may have only 
lived a short time in comparison to their natal family. While it is possible that the religiosity 
of the marital family is different from that of the natal family, it is not likely, particularly in 
a place like Nepal where religious-endogamy is the norm (Ghimire et al. 2006). The benefit 
of this measurement strategy is that it captures the more proximal religious environment in 
relation to fertility preferences, but to the extent that the religiosity of one's natal family 
could be more influential, it would be more ideal to have a measure of that family context 
for everyone.
Regarding the specific theologies and general value orientations we were able to examine, 
we present evidence that strong preferences for sons and for not being childless are highly 
related to one's family size preference. These results demonstrate how the ideational forces 
of son preference and of childbearing at least partly account for how High Caste Hindu 
religio-ethnic identification is associated with larger family size ideals than for the more 
Buddhist groups. While other studies have shown that son preference generally increases 
fertility demand and family size (Niraula and Morgan 1995), this study shows how son 
preference varies by religio-ethnic group. Son preference is not a purely religious ideology. 
It jointly stems from years of patrilineal family organization and economic advantage 
granted to males. Religious ideals requiring the birth of a son for a father to be reborn and to 
conduct parents’ funeral rites connect religious identity to thinking about family size 
strategies necessary for the ideal gender composition.
Overall, demonstrating links between different facets of religion and family size preferences 
elucidates our understanding of how religion connects to fertility specifically and family 
processes more generally. Of course, this depends on the strength of the relationship 
Pearce et al. Page 15













between fertility preferences and behavior across groups. Stated ideals are often different 
from actual behavior, but fertility preferences are one of the best predictors of fertility 
behavior (Schoen et al 1999). In fact, for the cohort in question, their preferred family size in 
1996 (between 2 and 3) is not far from Nepal's TFR ten or fifteen years later (3.1 and 2.6 
respectively), which is a reflection of their actual, subsequent fertility behavior (Ministry of 
Health and Population et al. 2012). Furthermore, because we find that religion is related to 
family size preferences independent of education and parental characteristics our analyses 
provide evidence that religion is one of the more salient, or dominant, influences on fertility 
preferences. In the end, the unique evidence we present provides additional motivation for 
religion to be conceptualized as multi-dimensional, operating through beliefs and practices. 
It also highlights the value in exploring social dimensions of religious influence. Religious 
qualities of social networks and contexts influence individuals, independent of their own 
beliefs and practices.
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Response alternatives and coding scheme for Coombs scale family size preference measure
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Coding of Coombs gender preference scale, a measure of general value orientation
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis of the association between religion and family size 
preferences among 15-24 year olds, Chitwan, Nepal, 1996 (N=1,518)
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Family size preference
    Coombs Scale (see Figure 1 for coding scheme) 5.66 1.74 1 22
Religio-ethnic identity
    High Caste Hindu 0.57 0.50 0 1
    Low Caste Hindu 0.13 0.33 0 1
    Gurung/Lama/Tamang 0.16 0.37 0 1
    Tharu 0.14 0.35 0 1
Religiosity: religious practice (frequency of praying at temple)
    Individual 1.04 0.55 0 2
    Household average 1.02 0.40 0 2
Particular Theologies
        Religious theologies
        No children, no heaven 2.18 0.69 1 4
        Importance of death rituals 0.74 0.44 0 1
        General value orientations
        Men should make household decisions 2.91 0.82 1 4
        Son preference scale 6.00 1.43 1 8
        It is okay for a person to decide not to have any children. 2.32 0.64 1 4
Characteristics
    Parental
        Parents’ attended school (0=none, 1=one, 2=both) 0.69 0.71 0 2
        Number of mother's children ever born 5.31 2.11 1 15
    Individual
        Own education (years) 6.69 3.47 0 14
        Own media exposure 1.72 0.70 0 3
        Respondent ever married 0.38 0.49 0 1
Demographic controls
    Female 0.57 0.50 0 1
    Age 18.98 2.83 15 24
Source: Chitwan Valley Family Study, 1996
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Table 2
Multilevel regression estimates (odds ratios and significance statistics) of associations between religion 
measures and family size preferences among 15-24 year olds; Chitwan, Nepal, 1996
1 2 3 4 5
Religio-ethnic identity
a




−0.12 (−0.79) −0.10 (−0.63) −0.10 (−0.63) −0.10 (−0.67)
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−2 Log Likelihood 5917 5887 5885 5885 5851
ICC 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
N=1518
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Source: As in Table 1.
a
Reference category is High Caste Hindu
*
P < .05, one tailed test
**
P < .01, one tailed test
***
P < .001, one tailed test; t-ratios in parentheses
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